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ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION RELIES ON A
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND AS A RESULT THE
COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW IS NOT REASONABLE OR
RATIONAL
R. R. Donnelly and Sedgwick Jones (hereinafter referred to as "Donnelly") admit that the

Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-1, et seq., does not expressly grant
discretion to the commission to interpret the law. Donnelly claims that Utah Code Ann. § 35-116(1) was amended in 1994 somehow effecting the Stokes v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah1 decision. However, the 1994 amendment does not change the fact that the
Industrial Commission in this case was construing Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 which provides in
pertinent part:
Each employee...who is injured...by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred... shall be paid compensation....
Id. This Court recently reaffirmed that the Act does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion
to the Commission to interpret this statutory language. Therefore, the Commission's
interpretation of the Act is reviewed for correctness. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm. of Utah.
901 P.2d 281,283 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Nonetheless, as Donnelly points out, the Industrial Commission in this case has discretion
to apply its factual findings to the law, and the Commission's application will not be disturbed
unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Id However,
when the Industrial Commission's application of the facts to the law is predicated upon an

*832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2

erroneous understanding of what the law is, itsfinaldetermination almost of necessity exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
In this case the Industrial Commission found that a special hazard was not associated
with the route taken by Ms. Kunz. Both the ALJ and the Industrial Commission
misapprehended the law when they found it relevant that (1) ice and snow in northern Utah in
January is a common fact of life, (2) there was no evidence that the condition at the site of Ms.
Kunz's accident was different than conditions elsewhere in Provo, and (3) that it was a natural
result that outdoor sidewalks, stairs, and ramps were slick. The controlling law in Utah provides
that the above stated factors should have been irrelevant to the Industrial Commission's
determination. Therefore, the Industrial Commission and the ALJ attempted to apply law which
does not exist.
Likewise, the Industrial Commission's holding that an alternate and substantially more
safe route was available is neither sustainable by controlling law nor as a factual finding is the
conclusion sustainable under the evidence. Since the stairs were the normal and more direct
route to the front door, Ms. Kunz's use of the route was closely associated with her employment.
As a result, her injury arose out of and was in the course of her employment.
Because the Industrial Commission and the ALJ applied the wrong law to the facts, their
application of an erroneous legal premise was by definition beyond the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality.

3

II.

THE SNOW AND ICE UPON WHICH MS. KUNZ FELL CONSTITUTED A
SPECIAL HAZARD
Donnelly, like the ALJ and the Industrial Commission, ignores Utah law in its discussion

of whether a special hazard exists in this case. Because the abundant case law cited by Ms. Kunz
in her principal brief could not be distinguished by Donnelly, the respondent simply brushed
aside all of the cases. While acknowledging that Ms. Kunz was arguing that common perils such
as ice and snow can constitute a hazard under the special hazards exception, Donnelly has
proffered no case lawfromany jurisdiction which holds that snow and ice is not a hazard under
the special hazards exception because it is a common peril. Contrary to respondent's assertion,
the simple fact that an entire city or region experiences fog, rain, ice or snow does not take the
condition at the employee's place of employment outside the special hazards exception. See
Respondent's brief at 16. Instead, as the court in Jones v. Wendy's of Tri-State MalL 1996 WL
30239 (Del. Super. Jan. 23,1996) held:
Due to the location of the employer's building within the mall parking lot, in order to get
to work [the claimant] was forced to traverse the icy parking lot to get to work.
IdLat3.
As asserted in petitioner's principal brief, the Utah Supreme Court decision in Park Utah
Consolidated Mines v. Industrial Comm.. 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943) controls in this
matter. In Park Utah, the applicant had slipped on a roadway leading to the place of her
employment. The Park Utah court did not find it necessary that the employees uniformly
followed the same exact route, but only that the applicant and the others uniformly traveled the
same approximate course. It can hardly be argued in this matter that the applicant and others
4

uniformly traveled the exact approximate course where the applicant fell. There was but a single
entrance to the building. (R. 638). In holding that the applicant was entitled to benefits, the Park
Utah court commented:
When the employee arrives at the threshold of his employment and the means for
entrance are limited so that he has no choice as to the mode of entrance, all of the
hazards which are peculiar to such entrance attach to his employment. The
converse is equally true as to leaving the employment. The employee in this case
had only one means of exitfromthe premises, although it is true that the yard
sloping down to the public road measures approximately fifty feet in width. The
applicant could not leave the premisesfromthe steps to the shop for the reason
that they were blocked by snow. It may be true that if applicant had not walked
quite as far to the north in leaving the premises he might not have slipped or
might not have fallen, but even if the supposition were a fact it would be wholly
immaterial. The employees in effect had an entrance and exit fifty feet in width,
as the only practical means of access to and exitfromthe premises.
Id at 317. The same can be said of Ms. Kunz in this case. There was but one entrance to the
building. There was a single staircase which happened to have a disabled person's ramp next to
it. It is complete supposition and conjecture to allege that if Ms. Kunz had taken the ramp she
would not have fallen. If Ms. Kunz had not taken the most direct route to thefrontdoor of the
building, she may well have slipped walking along the sidewalk in order to get to the ramp.
Likewise she could have slipped on the ramp itself as snow had accumulated there. While the
evidence indicates that water might not accumulate as easily on the ramp, it is incontroverted
that at the time of the accident snow was in fact upon the ramp. (R. 640).
Both Donnelly and the Industrial Commission, as stated, rely heavily upon the fact that
the snow and ice could be considered a common peril. The Commission held that the snow and
ice in January is a "common fact of life." (R. 506). The Commission further held that there was
no evidence that conditions were different elsewhere in Provo, that it is a natural result of snow
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that sidewalks, stairs and ramps are slick,2 and that everyone in the same general area faced the
same condition. These are simply irrelevant considerations. In Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial
Comm. of Utah. 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 (1926), a case upon which Park Utah relies, an
employee was killed while crossing a rail-road track to get to the Bountiful Brick plant. The
Bountiful Brick court noted:
The employee, in crossing the track at any time, was exposed to a peril which is common
to all, but by virtue of his employment he was required to cross the track regularly and
continuously thus being peculiarly and abnormally exposed to a common peril.
Id. at 556. Likewise, while snow and ice might be natural and common in Provo in January, it
was Ms. Kunz's employment with Donnelly which necessitated her regular and continuous
crossing of the sidewalk and staircase at issue. The fact that the hazard was common to all is
immaterial. Instead, the material facts which the Industrial Commission ignored along with the
precedent of Bountiful Brick is that the reason Ms. Kunz was walking up the staircase in the first
place was its inextricable connection with her workplace.
Donnelly's assertion that the special hazards exception does not apply to common perils
or hazards to which the public is exposed wholly ignores the holding in Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Industrial Comm.. 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922), which was the first decision to recognize the
exception to the going and coming rule. In Cudahy. the hazard was a railroad crossing, which
while mostly traversed by employees of Cudahy, was open to the public and the record in fact
showed public use of the area. Even under those conditions, the exception applied and benefits
were awarded.
2

It is important to note that the Industrial Commission assumed that the ramp itself would
be slick.
6

Donnelly claims that the Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey>
709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) found that the elements of the special hazard exception could not be
satisfied because there was no "special hazard." This was not the holding of the court. The
Soldier Creek court noted:
Nothing in the police report or the testimony of any witnesses suggest that the curve was
in anyway dangerous.
Id. at 1167. Thus, as the Utah Supreme Court later pointed out in Cherne Construction v. Posso.
735 P.2d 384 (Utah 1987), the Soldier Creek court found the special hazards exception
inapplicable because "there is no evidence to suggest that the curve in the road caused Bailey's
accident." Id at 385 (quoting Soldier CreeL 709 P.2d at 1167).3 In this case, however, the
evidence is undisputed that Ms. Kunz fell on ice on the steps leading to the door of the place of
her employment and that her fall caused her injuries. Therefore, it is completely unrebutted that
the hazard, the snow and ice, caused the accident.
Because the ALJ and the Industrial Commission's conclusion relied on a false
understanding of what the law is, its application of the law was erroneous. The Industrial
Commission and the ALJ ignored Utah precedent and as a result the Industrial Commission's
conclusion should be vacated and the matter remanded for determination of the amount of
benefits to be awarded.

likewise in Wilkinson v. Industrial Comm.. 23 Utah 2d 428, 464 P.2d 589 (1970) the
holding of the court was that no hazard caused the accident.
7

III.

ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE RAMP PROVIDED A SAFER ALTERNATIVE
ROUTE WAS INSUBSTANTIAL; IN ANY EVENT, THE RAMP DID NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE MATERIAL TO THE SPECIAL
HAZARDS EXCEPTION
In this matter there really was not an alternative route. Had the ramp been attached and

completely parallel to the steps, it could hardly be argued that it would constitute an alternative
route. In this case there is but a single entrance. Even if this Court were to consider the ramp an
alternative route, there is no evidence that it was safer on the day of the accident. As the court in
Park Utah pointed out, while it may be true that an applicant could have walked a litter further
one way or the other, such supposition is wholly immaterial. Park Utah. 133 P.2d at 317.
Instead, this Court must look at the totality of the evidence and determine if there is substantial
evidence to support both the Industrial Commission is factual finding and their application of the
law to that factual finding.
The record does contain some evidence of the viability of the ramp as an access way to
the front door of Ms. Kunz's employment. The ramp was located "thirty feet [from the] stepped
pathway." (R. 478). The ramp had hand rails. (R. 752). The ramp was made of a smooth
surface and water would normally drain more efficiently from that surface. (R. 752). The ramp
had a gradual slope. (R. 752). It had snowed approximately one half inch to one inch the night
before, and that the snow had been partially clearedfromthe walks. (R. 667). However, the
snow had not been clearedfromthe ramp, nor had it been clearedfromthe walk leadingfromthe
sidewalk to the steps. (R. 639). As stated, the Industrial Commission found that the ramp was
probably slick. (R. 506). Ms. Kunz understood that the stairs constituted the regular route taken
by employees. (R. 644). In fact, as far as Ms. Kunz knew, the stairs constituted the only route
8

the petitioner and other employees used. (R. 644). The only other witness, Karen LaFramboise,
testified that both the ramp and stairs had been used by employees in the past and the area
generally gets slippery with inclement weather. (R. 752). Ms. La Framboise indicated that she
used the ramp "if I can get that far." (R. 754). Donnelly claims that Ms. Kunz has taken that
statement out of context. However, the context isfreelyavailable for the appellate court to
review. The statement indicates that at some times Ms. LaFramboise cannot get that far. In any
event, the foregoing constitutes a complete marshaling of the evidence in support of the
Industrial Commission's conclusion that the ramp provided an alternative and that that
alternative was substantially safer. However, despite this evidence and any reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, thefindingthat the ramp was either an alternative route or
substantially safer is not supported by substantial evidence.
A review of the pictures attached to both the Ms. Kunz and Donnelly's briefs show that
the ramp was indeed farther from the entrance to the place of employment than the stairs. The
stairs,fromthe direction the petitioner was coming, constituted a far more direct route to the
front door. Likewise, the stairs have handrails. In fact, Ms. Kunz indicated that she tried to grab
the handrail as she fell. (R. 641). The Industrial Commission concluded in an unreasonable and
irrational fashion that instead of taking a more direct route and more convenient route to the front
door of her place of employment, crossing upon flat surface steps, Ms. Kunz should have
traversed a sloping ramp which was covered with snow. It is unreasonable to expect a reasonable
person to take a longer route on a slippery surface and increase the likelihood of falling. The
ramp was not more level than the steps, as the Industrial Commission found (R. 506), it was not
more convenient, and it was not substantially safer. This Court need only look at the pictures in
9

evidence in order to conclude that under no standard of reasonableness can the Industrial
Commission's conclusion that the ramp was more level be sustained.
In the final analysis, the stairs and ramp constituted a single entrance. When Ms. Kunz
parked her car and attempted to make her way to the only entrance to her employment, she took
the most direct route following the sidewalk. Had she fallen but two paces prior to where she did
fall, there would be no need to make artificial distinctions between what really constituted a
single entrance. The entire area, the access way to the building, had not been cleared of snow. If
the whole area gets slippery as Donnelly's witness Ms. LaFramboise indicated (R. 752), then
walking further along the sidewalk and up the ramp would constitute a higher potential for
slipping and falling. In fact, had Ms. Kunz taken the route suggested by Donnelly and fallen,
Donnelly would now be arguing to this Court that it was unreasonable for her to not take the
most direct route of the stairs and thus diminish the possibility of her falling.
The Bountiful Brick court styled the employer's argument as follows:
The main contention made by the plaintiffs is that there was a route or a way available to
the employee along the Burn's road and the public street, which, altogether greater in
distance, was less hazardous because the crossing of the rail-road track was a public one
where the trains must be operated with greater care to avoid accidents and injuries[.]
Bountiful Brick. 251 P.2d at 556. In rejecting this argument, the Bountiful Brick court noted:
The route taken was the most direct and shortest and was used by other employees, with
the knowledge of the employer who made no objection.
Id. In this case, Ms. Kunz took the most direct and shortest route, a route which to her
knowledge was the normal route which employees took. In Bountiful Brick the court found that
the decedent had "traveled over the route which was generally used by other employees- the
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natural, practical, customary route." Id Likewise in this case Ms. Kunz took the natural,
practical, and customary route.
The fact that Ms. Kunz could have deviated in one direction or another does not change
the fact there was but a single entrance to her place of employment, and that if she had taken the
ramp in question, that circuitous route would have increased, not diminished, her chances of
slipping. The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the ramp is more level than the stairs is
simply untenable. Likewise, it is pure supposition that Ms. Kunz would have been safer by
taking the ramp which was sloped and covered with snow.
Donnelly's argument that holding for Ms. Kunz in this case would extend benefits to all
employees in inclement weather from the doorsteps of their homes finds no basis in reality. As
the court in Bountiful Brick pointed out, it is not the common peril which makes a hazard a
special hazard of employment. Instead, as the Soldier Creek court pointed out: "There must be a
close association of the access way with the employer's premises." Soldier Creek. 709 P.2d at
1166. It cannot be reasonably argued that there is not a close association of the stairs in this case
and the employers premises. A review of the photographs attached to both parties' briefs
evidences that the stairs were but a few feet from the entrance to the building. The Industrial
Commission's Order must be reversed and the matter remanded.
IV.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIAL HAZARDS EXCEPTION ANNOUNCED
IN THE SOLDIER CREEK DECISION HAVE BEEN MET IN THIS CASE
If the Industrial Commission had applied a correct understanding of the law, it would

have found that the elements of the Soldier Creek decision had been met. There was a close
association of the access way with the employers business. There was but one door to the
11

building. The petitioner was taking the most direct routefromher vehicle to that door. It cannot
be reasonably argued that the stairs did not constitute the normal access way to that door under
the evidence of this case.
There was a special hazard associated with the access way to Ms. Kunz's place of
employment, which hazard was the snow and ice. The undisputed evidence before the Industrial
Commission showed that Ms. Kunz did in fact slip on snow and ice. There is absolutely no
evidence that Ms. Kunz could have avoided the hazard by taking an alternative route. If she had
walked further along the sidewalk to access the ramp, she could have slipped there. Likewise, it
is pure supposition that had she walked further along the sidewalk or taken the ramp she would
not have slipped. The sloping ramp was covered with snow. Utah law is inapposite to the
Industrial Commission's conclusions. Snow and ice in Utah can constitute a hazard.
Ms. Kunz was exposed to the hazard because of the use of the route. The stairs were but
a few feet awayfromthe front door. Lastly, the proximate cause of the fall was the ice and
snow. This point is undisputed. Accordingly, the proximate cause of the injuries to the
employee in this case was a special hazard associated with the access way to the employer's
business. Both the Park Utah and Bountiful Brick cases clearly establish precedent that a natural
element or common peril does not bring a hazard out of the special hazards exception. A denial
of benefits to Ms. Kunz is inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Cudahy.
Bountiful Brick, and Park Utah. The Industrial Commission simply misunderstood the law.
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CONCLUSION
Because the Industrial Commission misunderstood the law, it has denied Ms. Kunz
benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation laws of the State of Utah. The Industrial
Commission failed to construe the Workers Compensation Act in favor of the employee, and by
the denial of benefits, Ms. Kunz has been substantially prejudiced. As a result, and pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law must be reversed and the matter remanded for determination of the amount of benefits to
be awarded.
DATED AND SIGNED this

of May, 1996.
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IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Petitioner
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